



OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

# SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS



2020

APRIL - SEPTEMBER

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# MESSAGE FROM THE ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY



On behalf of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG), I am pleased to present our *Semiannual Report* summarizing the team's work and accomplishments for the period of April 1, 2020, through September 30, 2020. I thank everyone whose professionalism, dedication, and support enabled this important work.

Although the IC IG continues to be impacted by the ongoing pandemic, we are steadily progressing on the path back to full operations, and accomplishing our vital mission, while protecting the health and safety of our people. This report summarizes some

of the significant audits, inspections, investigations, reviews, hotline, and other activity that occurred during this reporting period, and reflects our ongoing commitment to conduct independent and objective oversight of matters within the responsibility of the Director of National Intelligence.

We continue to work closely and collaboratively with the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum, the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Congress, and others.

We continue to be guided by the IC IG core values of Integrity, Independence, Commitment, Diversity, and Transparency, and the ODNI core values of Excellence, Courage, Respect, and Integrity.

We appreciate the ongoing support from ODNI, Congress, and others as we continue to navigate

through these unprecedented and challenging times together. The IC IG team is resilient and will continue providing effective oversight to the best of our abilities. As a result, we help improve the Intelligence Community and strengthen the Nation.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Thomas A. Monheim". The signature is fluid and cursive.

Thomas A. Monheim  
Acting Inspector General of  
the Intelligence Community  
October 30, 2020

# INTRODUCTION

## AUTHORITY

The *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010* established the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG) within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The IC IG has the authority to initiate and conduct independent audits, inspections, investigations, and reviews of programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).

## MISSION

The IC IG's mission is to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration and implementation of the programs and activities within the DNI's responsibility and authority, and to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse in those programs and activities. We also lead and coordinate the efforts of the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum.

## STRATEGIC GOAL

The ICIG's strategic goal is to have a positive and enduring impact throughout the Intelligence Community (IC), to lead and coordinate the efforts of an integrated Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum, and to enhance the ability of the United States Intelligence Community to meet national security needs while respecting our nation's laws and reflecting its values.

## CORE VALUES

INTEGRITY

INDEPENDENCE

COMMITMENT

DIVERSITY

TRANSPARENCY

## INDEPENDENCE

The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community is appointed by the President of the United States, with the advice and consent of the United States Senate. The IC IG bases its findings and conclusions on independent and objective analysis of the facts and evidence that are revealed through audits, investigations, inspections, and programmatic reviews. During this reporting period, the IC IG had full and direct access to all relevant information needed to perform its duties.

# ABOUT US

The IC IG's leadership team includes the Inspector General (IG), Principal Deputy IG, Special Advisor to the IG, Counsel to the IG, five Assistant Inspectors General, and one Center Director.

The IC IG employs a highly skilled, committed, and diverse workforce, including permanent employees (cadre), employees from other IC elements and other government entities on detail to the IC IG (detailees), and contractors. Additional personnel details are listed in the classified Annex of the IC IG's *Semiannual Report*.



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# IC IG WORKFORCE INITIATIVES

## DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION

Since being named the Acting Inspector General, Mr. Monheim has emphasized his commitment to diversity and inclusion, both within the IC IG and in the broader Inspector General community. He became a member of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency's (CIGIE's) Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Work Group and has facilitated discussions about diversity and inclusion with other members of the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum (the Forum). He also shared with the IC IG workforce a statement highlighting important workplace diversity and inclusion principles to underscore the importance of the IC IG's core value of Diversity.

## IC IG MANAGEMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE

The IC IG established the IC IG Management Advisory Committee (MAC) during the reporting period. The IC IG MAC is an employee-driven advisory committee developed to provide a forum for open communication between IC IG leadership and the workforce. The MAC will work to resolve issues and concerns impacting the IC IG, and to advance the IC IG's core values of Integrity, Independence, Commitment, Diversity, and Transparency. Through partnership with IC IG leadership, the MAC will also seek opportunities to increase employee engagement, boost innovation, and strengthen the IC IG's ability to conduct independent and objective audits, inspections, investigations, and reviews efficiently and effectively. A working group will finalize the MAC charter in October and initiate the selection of the initial MAC membership in November 2020.

# COVID-19 PANDEMIC RESPONSE

The coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has been one of the greatest global upheavals in modern times, challenging our perceptions of and procedures for “normal” operations. The IC IG responded to this challenge by adopting an operational model that managed the crisis while seizing the opportunity to grow, change, and build for the future. The IC IG’s reaction to the pandemic can be categorized in two timeframes: Response and Recovery.

## RESPONSE:

In January 2020, the World Health Organization reported an outbreak of novel coronavirus-related pneumonia in China and in March declared a global pandemic. The United States Government instructed federal agencies to scale down operations to mission-critical services to help contain the coronavirus spread. In response to this instruction, the IC IG followed ODNI’s protocol. We significantly reduced on-site staffing and sent the majority of the workforce home under approved “weather and safety” leave to ensure their health and safety while maintaining operational continuity. The IC

The IC IG structured its recovery plan around three goals:

1

Protect the health and safety of the IC IG workforce

2

Rapidly assess priorities and the resources required to execute them

3

Incrementally increase work capacity to accomplish the IC IG mission reasonably and responsibly

IG Assistant Inspector General for Planning and Operations joined the ODNI Senior Leader Recovery Group (SLRG) — a group charged with sharing information and coordinating the implementation of the ODNI COVID-19 Recovery Plan — and began the process of building a plan for the safe return of IC IG personnel to full operations at the appropriate time.

Concurrently, the IC IG engaged with counterparts across the federal government through the Forum and CIGIE. The Inspectors General actively participated in recurring virtual meetings to compare and assess pandemic response plans and management of their respective workforces and program deliverables during the crises.

## MISSION SUPPORT DIVISION

COVID-19 PANDEMIC RESPONSE, *Continued*

### RECOVERY:

Returning to work required the IC IG to navigate a whole new “normal” that included changes to how employees work, where they work, and the tools necessary to execute their work. In April, the IC IG established weekly senior leadership team meetings to evaluate our commitments and mission requirements; facilitate communication, collaboration, synchronization, and alignment of resources; and establish a framework to begin to re-engage the workforce and gradually bring operations back online. Through these productive exchanges, the leadership team assumed the role of recovery team leaders. The team gathered requirements for return to the office, including an assessment of:

- Mission areas most impacted by the COVID-19 staff drawdown;
- Operational areas that could be restructured to address higher priority efforts;
- The percentage of our mission that could be addressed using flexible workplace guidance;
- The percentage of our contractor workforce required to return to work at our physical office locations;
- How we might achieve social distancing onsite; and,
- Accommodations for elevated risk personnel.

The information gathered through this assessment informed the development of our recovery plan. The team agreed upon a priority-based, phased approach for recovery and operational reconstitution that aligned with our corporate guiding principles and addressed time-sensitive mission requirements.

The team prioritized taking care of our people so that we could accomplish the mission, and developed a recovery and reconstitution plan that inspired resiliency, allowed for a responsible and safe return to operations; and empowered execution at the lowest levels possible. The plan embraced flexibility and creativity; respected the workforce’s concerns related to the crises and its impact on their lives; and, considered complex legal, logistical, and practical issues while complying with ODNI guidance and approvals for such resources as personal protective equipment, virtual tools, and flexible workplace agreements.

During the early phases of recovery (March – May), the senior leadership team conducted regular, virtual meetings with their respective teams to assess their health and wellbeing, communicate information related to recovery and reconstitution efforts, solicit input from the staff on ways to best support individual and mission requirements, and address any workforce questions or concerns. The office remained in a dramatically-reduced posture until June, when

the ODNI approved the incremental, staggered return of additional personnel to the workplace. The timeline for the IC IG recovery plan followed the ODNI’s planning structure, which consisted of multiple recovery periods each lasting several weeks. To limit the potential for cross-exposure and infection spread, personnel were assigned to segregated team cohorts (Blue and Gold teams) that were authorized to access the office on alternating weeks. Additionally, the IC IG broadly leveraged flexible workplace agreements to minimize the number of personnel onsite at any given time, and secured technical resources to support remote access to unclassified communications. The following metrics were tracked throughout the recovery to determine whether the organization would advance to the next recovery period with incremental increases in office occupancy percentages, pause in a recovery period, or revert to an earlier recovery period posture:

- Number of cases reported in ODNI facilities;
- Infection rate in the area;
- Hospital capacity in the area, and
- Availability of supplies (personal protective equipment and cleaning supplies).

The recovery plan was initiated at the beginning of June with a proposed schedule to restore full operational capacity. This schedule was dependent



## MISSION SUPPORT DIVISION

### COVID-19 PANDEMIC RESPONSE, *Continued*

upon established metrics supporting interrupted advancement through the planned recovery periods. The IC IG adopted a deliberate approach to reintegration, initially approving the return of members of the leadership team to the office only. Additional staff were incrementally reintegrated as we progressed through the recovery periods in accordance with established building occupancy thresholds.

Prior to initiation of recovery period one, the following actions were taken to prepare the physical workspaces and the workforce for a return to work:



#### INCREASED CLEANING

The frequency of cleaning throughout the facility was significantly increased with special emphasis on high touch areas.



#### PREVENTATIVE GUIDANCE

Signage was installed in each building providing guidance on social distancing, proper use of masks and face coverings, self-screening, and reporting suspected exposure or infection to COVID-19.



#### CONTACT TRACING

Contact tracing was expanded and infrared temperature screenings were enacted for facility access at the Reston 3 compound.



#### FLEXIBLE SCHEDULES

Workplace flexibilities were enhanced by implementing policies and procedures to permit staff personnel to conduct unclassified work from home under an approved flexible workplace agreement, and authorizing component directors to approve scheduling flexibility needed to address personal and mission needs. Continued leave flexibility for persons identified as elevated risk.



#### PERSONAL PROTECTION

Each office was equipped with personal protective equipment and cleaning supplies.



#### DISINFECTING SUPPLIES

Disinfecting supplies were installed in common areas such as conference rooms, copy areas, and pantry areas.



#### RESTRICTED TRAVEL

Foreign travel was prohibited and official domestic travel was restricted to mission critical requirements only.



#### SANITIZING STATIONS

Sanitizing stations containing hand sanitizer, masks, and gloves were installed at the entrances, elevator banks, and common areas of each building, and within each office.

## MISSION SUPPORT DIVISION

### COVID-19 PANDEMIC RESPONSE, *Continued*

The IC IG office spaces and personnel were prepared for the safe return of the workforce in accordance with ODNI guidelines. With the initiation of each recovery period, each employee (staff and contractor) was issued a reusable mask and hand sanitizer. Visits to IC IG offices were suspended during the recovery period; and, to the extent possible, interviews with complainants and subjects of audits, investigations, and reviews were conducted remotely using virtual tools. Any unavoidable in-person engagements were conducted in accordance with social distancing guidelines. To ensure the safety of personnel in the elevated risk category, all personnel who were identified as elevated risk have remained on weather and safety leave during the recovery period with many continuing to contribute to the mission by conducting work from home under approved flexible workplace agreements. These personnel will be reintegrated during the final recovery period or transitioned to reasonable accommodation agreements if applicable.

From the start of the recovery period to present, the team has continually re-evaluated and adjusted the plan as needed to account for changing information and circumstances. To ensure transparency in

communication, the IC IG representative to the SLRG continues to participate in weekly SLRG meetings and report information to the IC IG senior leadership team for dissemination to the workforce. Additionally, the Acting IG hosts virtual monthly Town Halls to keep the workforce connected and informed. To maintain the operational tempo and continue to foster collaboration, the IC IG leadership team participates in virtual weekly coordination meetings, and each Assistant Inspector General and Team Lead meets weekly or bi-weekly with the Acting IG to review activities within their area of responsibility. The Acting IG also virtually hosts regular meetings with Forum members and participates virtually in CIGIE meetings. The office continues to progress, in accordance with ODNI guidance on occupancy levels, toward a full return to operations. To date, IC IG has not had a single incident of infection among IC IG personnel.

The IC IG team is resilient and will continue providing independent and effective oversight to the best of our abilities. As a result, we help improve the Intelligence Community and strengthen the Nation.



# MISSION SUPPORT DIVISION

The Mission Support Division provides management and administrative support to the entire IC IG office. The Mission Support Division is composed of multidisciplinary officers who provide expertise in financial management, human capital and talent management, facilities and logistics management, continuity of operations, administration, classification reviews, *Freedom of Information Act* (FOIA) and *Privacy Act* requests, information technology, communications, and quality assurance. The Division also delivers executive support to the Forum and its committees.



## PLANNING AND OPERATIONS

The Planning and Operations Unit supports operational matters across a range of functions, including strategy development, strategy performance oversight, internal management and alignment of resources to IC IG goals and priorities, resource allocation, implementation of cross-cutting business processes, management of support to the statutory Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum, budget, manpower, contracts, security, information technology, facilities, logistics, quality assurance, information management, classification, FOIA operations, and continuity of operations/emergency preparedness.



## TALENT STRATEGY, WORKFORCE ENGAGEMENT, AND COMMUNICATIONS

The Talent Strategy, Workforce Engagement, and Communications Unit supports human capital and communications activities, including shaping and executing the office's human capital strategy, initiatives, and tactical plan, as well as all IC IG outreach activities, such as media engagements, strategic communications, corporate identity and brand management, and visual communication.

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During this reporting period, ODNI provided the IC IG adequate funding to fulfill its mission. The budget covered personnel services and general support, including travel, training, equipment, supplies, information technology support, and office automation requirements.

### Intelligence Community Inspectors General Conference and Awards Program

The Mission Support Division is responsible for planning and executing the annual Intelligence Community Inspectors General Conference and Awards Program. This year's program, scheduled to take place in April, was cancelled in mid-March due to concerns over the spread of COVID-19. The recipients of the Intelligence Community Inspectors General National Intelligence Professional Awards will be recognized for their superior performance and exceptional accomplishments in the coming months at a virtual ceremony.

## MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE

The Forum's Management and Administration Committee did not meet due to the ongoing pandemic. The committee currently plans to resume quarterly sessions in December 2020.

# AUDIT DIVISION

The Audit Division's mission is to conduct independent and objective audits and reviews of ODNI programs and activities, including those nondiscretionary audits required by law. Audit Division activities improve business practices to better support the IC's mission; promote the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of programs and operations throughout ODNI and the IC; and help reduce fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.

## AREAS OF FOCUS

- INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND SECURITY
- BUSINESS PRACTICES
- ACQUISITION POLICIES AND PRACTICES
- HUMAN CAPITAL
- PROJECT MANAGEMENT
- PERSONNEL SECURITY
- FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

Auditors assess whether programs are achieving intended results and whether organizations are complying with laws, regulations, and internal policies in carrying out programs. Recommendations made from the results of audits and projects enable ODNI management to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of ODNI programs.

## COLLABORATION AND OUTREACH EFFORTS

The Audit Division participates with other federal agencies and departments in conducting joint reviews of IC programs and activities. During the reporting period, the Audit Division led several collaboration and outreach efforts in areas of mutual interest across the IC Audit community.

**1** The Audit Division is working with Office of the Inspector General (OIG) officials from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the National Security Agency (NSA) on a cross-Community review of information security continuous monitoring (ISCM). ISCM is a risk management approach to cybersecurity that maintains an accurate picture of an agency's security risk posture; provides visibility into assets; and leverages use of automated data feeds to quantify risk, ensure effectiveness of security controls, and implement prioritized remedies. Utilizing uniform, agreed-upon questions, each OIG will assess its element's implementation of an ISCM program. Upon completion of the review, the IC IG will prepare a capstone report to provide an IC-wide perspective on issues with or lessons learned from implementing ISCM.

**2** In addition, the Audit Division is conducting a joint review with CIA, DIA, NGA, NRO, NSA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Department of State of data reported by IC elements in response to *Metrics Reporting Requirements for National Security Vetting in Fiscal Year 2018 and Beyond*. The DNI, as the Security Executive Agent, is responsible for assuring the quality, timeliness, consistency, and integrity of national security vetting practices. The audit will determine whether IC elements accurately capture, document, and report required security clearance processing timeliness information and whether challenges exist at the IC elements that contribute to non-compliance with reporting requirements.

**3** An IC IG auditor was assigned to participate on joint teams conducting external peer reviews of NRO OIG's and DIA OIG's quality control systems.

# AUDIT DIVISION PROJECTS

## AUD-2018-002: Office of the Director of National Intelligence's Government Travel Card Program (July 23, 2020)

Government travel cards are issued for the purpose of official travel and travel-related services. Cardholders are permitted to use their travel cards only for authorized expenses related to official travel, including air and rail fares, lodging, car rental and fuel costs, meals, and incidental costs.

We determined that ODNI had not implemented adequate controls over government travel cards and had not effectively managed claims and reimbursements of travel card transactions. The report included 11 recommendations, 6 of which were significant. We also made an observation on ODNI's compliance monitoring of ODNI policies.

*Additional details are listed in the classified Annex of the IC IG's Semiannual Report.*

## AUD-2020-003: Review of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's Fiscal Year 2019 Compliance with the *Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010* (September 2, 2020)

The *Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010* (IPERA) directs agencies to perform risk assessments of programs and activities to identify those that may be susceptible to significant improper payments. An improper payment is any payment that should not have been made; was a duplicate payment; was made without sufficient documentation; or was in the incorrect amount, to an ineligible recipient, for an ineligible service, or for services not received. When an agency identifies a program or activity that is susceptible to significant improper payments, the agency must estimate the amount of improper payments and report the estimates, actions taken to reduce improper payments, and improper payment rates of each program or activity. IPERA also directs agencies to conduct

recovery audits — also known as payment recapture audits — for each program and activity that expends \$1 million or more annually, if conducting such audits would be cost effective.

We determined that ODNI complied with IPERA for Fiscal Year (FY) 2019. ODNI tested non-contract payment transactions and determined that none of its programs and activities were susceptible to significant improper payments as defined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Based on this determination, ODNI was not required to prepare or report improper payment estimates, corrective action plans, reduction targets, or improper payment rates for its programs and activities. As required by IPERA, ODNI supported its determination that conducting payment recapture audits would not be cost effective. We did not make any recommendations, but did observe that invalid travel claims were not always identified and overpayments were not always consistently addressed.

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**The IC IG's audit activities are conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.**

# AUDIT COMMITTEE

In July 2020, the Audit Division hosted the Forum's Audit Committee and Cybersecurity Subcommittee quarterly meeting to discuss multiple topics of community interest. The virtual meeting included a roundtable discussion on the stages of recovery and reconstitution from the COVID-19 pandemic and its effects, if any, on ongoing audit efforts. Members discussed the pandemic's impact on the development of annual work plans and the inclusion of *Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act* projects into the plans. The committee also discussed the challenges and impacts of COVID-19 on recruiting efforts and staffing.

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The Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum's Audit Committee worked across the IC to address challenges to the mission and other efforts presented by COVID-19.

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The Audit Committee and Cybersecurity Subcommittee quarterly meetings have been impacted by the ongoing pandemic. Members continue to collaborate virtually, as needed. The next Audit Committee quarterly meeting is currently scheduled in October 2020.

# INSPECTIONS & EVALUATIONS DIVISION

The Inspections and Evaluations (I&E) Division's mission is to conduct oversight of programs within the DNI's responsibility and authority. The I&E Division provides the IC IG with an alternative to traditional audit and investigative disciplines to assess ODNI and IC programs and activities. The *CIGIE Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations* (Blue Book) gives the I&E Division flexibility to develop tailored approaches for determining efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and/or sustainability of agency operations, programs, or policies.

In addition, the I&E Division adds a unique benefit to the IC IG by offering a capability to conduct expedited management and program evaluations and respond to priority issues of concern to the ODNI, the IC, Congress, and the public.

The I&E Division conducts systemic and independent inspections and evaluations of ODNI components and IC elements, and it issues factual, evidence-based findings that are timely, credible, and useful for managers, policymakers, and stakeholders. Conclusions drawn from the results of inspections and evaluations generate

recommendations for decision makers to streamline operations, revise regulations as necessary, improve customer service, and minimize inefficient and ineffective procedures. They also improve the performance and integration of the ODNI and the broader IC. The multidisciplinary I&E Division staff uses various methods for gathering and analyzing data to measure performance; determine compliance with applicable law, regulation, and/or policy; and identify savings and funds for more effective use. The I&E Division's reports also share best practices or promising approaches; and assess allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.

## INSPECTION & EVALUATIONS DIVISION PROJECT

### INS-2020-003: Evaluation of ODNI Senior Executive Service Reporting (August 12, 2020)

In response to Section 6727 of the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020*, which was included as Division E of the *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020* (the Act), the I&E Division conducted an evaluation of Senior Executive Service (SES) positions within ODNI. Specifically, the Act requires a report that includes the number of required ODNI SES positions; whether such requirements are reasonably based on the mission of the ODNI; and a comparison of the number of ODNI SES positions to the number of senior positions in comparable organizations.

The I&E Division's report documented the number of ODNI required SES positions but could not determine whether the positions were reasonably based on ODNI's mission. The report concluded that there were no government organizations that were comparable to the ODNI based on the breadth of its mission and the size of its workforce. Accordingly, the report did not include any recommendations.

*Additional details are listed in the classified Annex of the IC IG's Semiannual Report.*

# INSPECTIONS COMMITTEE

Due to COVID-19, the Forum's Inspections Committee did not hold an official meeting. However, members participated in virtual discussions on multiple topics of community interest including: the pandemic's impact on the workforce, recruitment, hiring, and development of annual work plans; and, recovery and reconstitution best practices. Inspections Committee members also synchronized key activities and mission-related initiatives to include discussing potential approaches to comply with a recently issued Executive Order (and related OMB guidance), and considering methodology options for conducting a congressionally-mandated classification review. Finally, members discussed

Blue Book revisions, processes related to peer review scheduling and execution, and re-branding initiatives to more clearly define the impact inspections and evaluations have on the OIG mission.

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Inspections Committee Members worked across the Intelligence Community to address challenges to the mission and other efforts presented by COVID-19.

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The pandemic impacted the frequency of the Inspections Committee quarterly meetings; however, members continued to collaborate virtually on an as needed basis. The next Inspections Committee quarterly meeting is currently scheduled in November 2020.



# INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

The Investigations Division conducts proactive and reactive criminal and administrative investigations arising from complaints or information from any person concerning the existence of an activity within the authorities and responsibilities of the DNI constituting a violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety. The Investigations Division identifies and reports internal control weaknesses that could render ODNI or other IC programs and systems vulnerable to exploitation, or that could be used as leverage for illicit activity. The Investigations Division also plays a principal role in tracking, monitoring, and investigating unauthorized disclosures of classified information.

The Investigations Division's ability to investigate programs and activities within the authorities and responsibilities of the DNI enables the Division to partner with, and provide assistance to, other OIGs conducting investigations concerning IC programs and activities. In addition, the Investigations Division is able to coordinate and assist with the prosecution of criminal matters arising from the six independent intelligence agencies: NRO, NGA, NSA, DIA, CIA, and ODNI.

**The IC IG's investigation activities conform to standards adopted by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.**

## INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY OVERVIEW

During this reporting period, the Investigations Division continued its efforts on five joint criminal investigations. Partners included other IC OIGs, the FBI, other federal investigative agencies, the Department of Justice Public Integrity Section, and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. The investigations involved a variety of subject matters, including fraud, counterintelligence, and public corruption.



### NOTEWORTHY JOINT INVESTIGATION

A former Drug Enforcement Administration public affairs officer's federal felony conviction for defrauding at least a dozen companies of a total of over \$4.4 million by impersonating as a CIA covert agent. Sentencing is currently scheduled for October 2020. We expect some of these joint criminal investigations to continue into the next reporting period due to the size, scope, and complex nature of these matters.

# INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

## ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS SUMMARY

### TABLE 2

Data contained in this report and table was obtained from IC IG Case Management Tracking System.



NUMBER OF CASES	CASE SUBJECT / ALLEGATION
2	Contract and Procurement Fraud
1	Procurement Integrity Violation
1	Unauthorized Disclosure
3	Conflict of Interest
5	Contractor Cost Mischarging (Labor)
2	Misuse of Government Property (Computer)
3	Retaliation/Abuse of Authority
1	Employee Misconduct
1	Use of Illegal Drugs
1	Waste of Government Resources
1	Misappropriation of Funds
1	Theft of Government Funds
1	Wire Fraud
23	TOTAL OPEN INVESTIGATIONS

THE IC IG DID NOT ISSUE ANY SUBPOENAS DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD.

# INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

## SUMMARIES OF PUBLISHED REPORTS



### Conflict of Interest

Following an investigation, we determined that an ODNI employee knowingly participated personally and substantially in a contract matter in which the employee had a financial interest in the outcome. However, the evidence also showed that the employee properly recorded their financial interest in advance, consulted with appropriate supervisory personnel about the potential conflict, and acted in accordance with supervisory guidance for conflict mitigation. After careful consideration, we determined that the available evidence was insufficient to support criminal prosecution or disciplinary action.

### Reprisal and Abuse of Authority

An ODNI employee alleged that a supervisor retaliated by withholding a favorable personnel action after the employee made a whistleblower disclosure. Our investigation determined that the supervisor did not have knowledge of the employee's disclosure, nor was the supervisor the official responsible for withholding the favorable personnel action. Moreover, we found that the favorable personnel action would have been withheld regardless of the employee's disclosure. Based on our findings, we determined the allegation could not be substantiated.

### Employee Misconduct

We reviewed allegations that ODNI and Department of Defense (DoD) employees may have possessed and transmitted digital storage media containing intelligence and defense information, without proper authorization. Our investigation determined that the employees requested, obtained, and transmitted the digital storage media with proper authorization and following appropriate security protocols. The allegations could not be substantiated.

## INVESTIGATIONS COMMITTEE

Due to the ongoing pandemic, the Forum's Investigations Committee did not have a formal meeting during this reporting period. However, committee members continued to virtually collaborate on an as needed basis to discuss pandemic response and various investigative efforts. The committee is currently scheduled to meet in October 2020.

# CENTER FOR PROTECTED DISCLOSURES

The IC IG’s Center for Protected Disclosures (the Center) processes disclosures and complaints reported by whistleblowers and provides guidance to individuals about the options and protections afforded to individuals who may wish to make protected disclosures to the IC IG and/or Congress, or who believe they suffered reprisal because they made a protected disclosure.



*Whistleblowing is the lawful disclosure to an authorized recipient of information a person reasonably believes evidences wrongdoing. It is the mechanism to relay the right information to the right people to counter wrongdoing and promote the proper, effective, and efficient performance of the IC’s mission. Whistleblowing in the IC is extremely important as it ensures that personnel can “say something” when they “see something” through formal reporting procedures without harming national security and without retaliation.*

# CENTER FOR PROTECTED DISCLOSURES

The Center performs four critical functions for whistleblowers in the IC.

**1** The Center, through the IC IG Hotline program, receives and processes whistleblower complaints of fraud, waste, abuse, or mismanagement of programs and activities within the responsibility of the DNI. There are three ways for complainants to report their concerns to the IC IG Hotline: (a) public and secure telephone numbers and website addresses; (b) walk-in meetings at the IC IG’s offices; (c) and drop boxes in ODNI facilities.

**2** The Center, through the IC IG Hotline program, also receives and processes allegations of “urgent concerns” pursuant to the *Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA)*, which has been codified as part of the IC IG’s authorizing statute, 50 U.S.C. § 3033(k)(5)(A). The ICWPA established a process to ensure that the DNI and congressional intelligence committees receive disclosures of serious or flagrant problems, abuses, violations of law or executive order, or deficiencies relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity.

In order to submit an urgent concern to the IC IG, the law requires that a complainant be “[a]n employee of an element of the intelligence community, an employee assigned or detailed to an element of the intelligence community, or an employee of a contractor to the intelligence community.” The ICWPA also requires that a complainant provide a complaint or

information with respect to an “urgent concern,” which is defined as one of the following:

A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of the law or Executive order, or deficiency relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence involving classified information, but does not include differences of opinions concerning public policy matters.

A false statement to Congress, or a willful withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity.

An action, including a personnel action described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code, constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal prohibited under subsection (g)(3)(B) of this section in response to an employee’s reporting an urgent concern in accordance with this paragraph.

If the IC IG determines that the complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the ICWPA, then the IC IG must within 14 calendar days determine whether the urgent concern allegation “appear[s] credible.”

# CENTER FOR PROTECTED DISCLOSURES

## FOUR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS FOR WHISTLEBLOWERS THE IC, *Continued*

The Center tracks all ICWPA disclosures, ensures review of materials for classified information, and coordinates disclosures with other OIGs for appropriate review and disposition. During the reporting period, the IC IG received and processed 13 allegations of “urgent concern” from IC personnel. Of the 13, the IC IG transmitted to the DNI 2 disclosures that the IC IG deemed to meet the statutory definition of an “urgent concern” and appeared credible. The IC IG subsequently forwarded those urgent concern matters to the congressional intelligence committees on behalf of the DNI.<sup>1</sup>

**3** The Center adjudicates requests by IC employees and contractors for the IC IG to review their allegations of reprisal under Presidential Policy Directive 19 (PPD-19), *Protecting Whistleblowers with Access to Classified Information*, and 50 U.S.C. §§ 3234 and 3341(j). These authorities prohibit acts of reprisal against employees and contractors serving in the IC, as well as those who are eligible for access to classified information, who make protected disclosures.

The Center also reviews determinations regarding whistleblower reprisal allegations made by other IC OIGs and determinations by non-IC OIGs regarding security clearance determinations alleged to be in reprisal for making a protected disclosure. A whistleblower who has exhausted his or her home agency’s whistleblower protection processes may request an External Review Panel (ERP). Under appropriate circumstances, the IC IG may convene an ERP and review the matter.

The Center received 8 new ERP requests during the current reporting period, 2 of which were closed and 6 are under review. The Center conducts an initial assessment and review of materials submitted by both the complainant and the complainant’s employing agency prior to reaching a determination. In total, the Center has 12 initial assessments of ERP requests currently pending, including 6 matters that were initiated during the previous reporting period.

**4** The Center conducts outreach across the community. The Center provides guidance to personnel seeking more information about the options and protections afforded to individuals who may wish to make a protected disclosure to the IC IG and/or Congress, or who believe they have suffered reprisal because they made a protected disclosure. The IC IG conducts community outreach and training activities to ensure stakeholders have accurate and consistent whistleblowing information relating to these and other matters.

<sup>1</sup> The total number of ICWPA complaints does not include allegations submitted by persons who are not members of the IC and thus do not meet the minimum requirements for filing an ICWPA complaint under the statute. Additionally, of the 11 ICWPA complaints that the IC IG did not forward to the DNI, the IC IG determined that 10 of the complaints did not meet the definition of an urgent concern and 1 was withdrawn by the complainant before the IC IG completed its review. Of the 10 complaints that the IC IG determined did not meet the definition of an urgent concern, 7 were filed by the same individual.

# CENTER FOR PROTECTED DISCLOSURES

## Activities during this reporting period

The Center received whistleblower disclosures, made referrals to other divisions and agencies, reviewed reports of urgent concern, and evaluated requests for ERPs.

The Center participated in virtual community events hosted by CIGIE's Hotline Working Group and the DoD Office of the Inspector General Hotline Program. The conference calls discussed best practices for handling Hotline complaints and follow-up activity conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic.

## IC HOTLINE WORKING GROUP


Because of the ongoing pandemic, the IC Hotline Working Group did not meet during the reporting period. The group is currently scheduled to meet virtually in November 2020 and plans to discuss hotline process changes and adjustments due to COVID-19 pandemic, among other topics.

## WHISTLEBLOWER WORKING GROUP

Because of the pandemic, the Whistleblower Working Group did not meet during the reporting period. An upcoming meeting will address ERP procedures.



The IC IG Hotline provides a confidential means for Intelligence Community employees, contractors, and the public to report information concerning suspected fraud, waste, and abuse of programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence. The Hotline can be contacted via classified and unclassified email and phone lines, U.S. mail, secure web submissions, walk-ins, and drop boxes located in select ODNI facilities.




### NEW CONTACTS LOGGED THIS REPORTING PERIOD\*



\*Due to COVID-19, the IC IG Hotline was unable to log all contacts received during this reporting period. All remaining contacts received during this period, will be reflected in the following SAR.

### METHODS OF CONTACT





# COUNSEL TO THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

The Office of the Counsel to the IC IG ensures that the Acting Inspector General and the other members of the IC IG team receive independent, confidential legal advice and policy counsel.

The Counsel team supports the Investigations Division throughout the investigative process by highlighting and providing guidance on potential legal issues meriting additional or redirected investigative efforts. The Counsel team supports the Audit Division and the I&E Division by identifying and interpreting key policy, contract, and legal provisions relevant to reported observations, findings, and recommendations. The Counsel team assists the Center for Protected Disclosures in evaluating whistleblower disclosures and ERP requests. The Counsel team also provides legal and policy guidance, and reviews matters related to IC IG personnel, administration, training, ethics, independence, and budgetary functions. Attorneys from the Counsel's office also participate in the Forum, the Forum's Counsels Committee, the IC IG Data Analytics working group, and

working groups of the Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council.

In addition, the Counsel team serves as the IC IG's congressional liaison. During the reporting period, the Counsel team arranged for and participated in several congressional briefings with the Acting IG and senior IC IG leadership, including briefings to Members of Congress and bipartisan, bicameral staff. The Counsel team also responded to formal congressional requests for information and reported on audits and reviews in response to congressional interest and legislative mandates.

## CONGRESSIONAL ENGAGEMENTS

- Participated in introductory engagements for the Acting Inspector General and bipartisan members and staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Senate Appropriations Committee – Defense (SAC-D), and House Appropriations Committee – Defense (HAC-D);
- Responded to multiple letters, emails, and phone calls from the intelligence oversight committees, as well as other Members and congressional staff, to address questions regarding pending legislation and other matters within the IC IG's jurisdiction; and
- Coordinated pre-publication review and provided formal comments to the Government Accountability Office in its review of IC whistleblower protections.

# COUNSELS COMMITTEE

The Forum's Counsels Committee meets regularly to discuss legal and policy issues of common interest to the IC, and to promote the consistent interpretation of statutes, regulations, policies, and Executive Orders. The Counsels Committee operates with the goal of providing legal analysis of, and options relating to, issues of particular importance to the Forum.



**During this reporting period, the Counsels Committee discussed and, when appropriate, collaborated on key initiatives, including the following:**

The Counsels Committee convened virtually to discuss proposed legislative provisions under consideration by SSCI and HPSCI for inclusion in the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021*.

The Counsels Committee commented on and assisted in drafting the IC IG's updated ERP procedures. With collaborative input from Counsels Committee and the Forum, these procedures will revise the existing procedures to reflect changes in law and practice.

The Counsels Committee continued to coordinate work in response to congressionally directed actions included in the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020*.

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Counsels discussed and provided comments on provisions considered for inclusion in the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021*.

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# ODNI MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES

In September 2020, the IC IG issued what it considered to be the most significant management and performance challenges facing the ODNI. The management and performance challenges will be included in the FY 2020 Agency Financial Report, published in November 2020.

The *Reports Consolidation Act of 2000* (Public Law 106-531) requires that the IC IG identify the most serious management and performance challenges facing the ODNI. Due to the ongoing pandemic, some of the work planned for FY 2020 was delayed and some previously planned projects were postponed. Based on the findings of completed audits, inspections, investigations, and other activities conducted by IC IG in FY 2020, the IC IG concludes that the most serious management and performance challenges facing ODNI are in the following areas:



**Reforming the Personnel Security Clearance Process**



**Improving Financial Management**



**Strengthening Information Security and Management**



**Improving Policy and Procedure Development and Implementation**



**Enhancing Intelligence Community Coordination, Integration, and Information Sharing**



**Championing Protected Disclosures**



## COVID-19

The emergence of COVID-19 as a global threat created rapidly escalating challenges for all federal agencies. COVID-19 has forced the organization to swiftly adjust the way it conducts business during public health emergencies to ensure mission continuity. As such, the IC IG has identified the impact of COVID-19 as an emerging challenge that will be monitored as appropriate and feasible through future projects.

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*The full report is included in the classified Annex of the IC IG's Semiannual Report.*

# THE FORUM

## INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INSPECTORS GENERAL FORUM

One of the most significant ways the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community works to improve the integration of the IC is through the Forum. By statute, the Forum consists of 12 statutory or administrative Inspectors General with oversight responsibility for an element of the IC. The IC IG is the Chair of the Forum.

Through the Forum, members can learn about the work of individual members that may be of common interest and discuss questions about jurisdiction or access to information and staff. As Chair, the IC IG leads the Forum by coordinating efforts to find joint solutions to mutual challenges for improved integration among the Forum members. Forum committees, topic-specific working groups, and subject matter experts generate ideas to address shared concerns and mutual challenges for consideration and decision by the Inspectors General.



Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (CHAIR)



Central Intelligence Agency  
Office of the Inspector General



Defense Intelligence Agency  
Office of the Inspector General



Department of Defense  
Office of the Inspector General



Department of Energy  
Office of the Inspector General



Department of Homeland Security  
Office of the Inspector General



Department of Justice  
Office of the Inspector General



Department of State  
Office of the Inspector General



Department of the Treasury  
Office of the Inspector General



National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency  
Office of the Inspector General



National Reconnaissance Office  
Office of the Inspector General



National Security Agency  
Office of the Inspector General

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# THE FORUM MEETING SUMMARIES

The Forum held three meetings during the reporting period.

**JUNE** The session in June addressed the IC’s ongoing response to the pandemic and related projects for the upcoming fiscal year, including work with CIGIE’s Pandemic Response Accountability Committee. The Forum also discussed various congressionally directed actions related to whistleblowers and discussed proposed revisions to the IC IG’s procedures related to External Review Panels, which evaluate matters raising allegations of whistleblower reprisal.

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**JULY** July’s meeting was a continuation of previous discussions related to provisions proposed by the congressional oversight committees for inclusion in the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021*. The Forum considered those proposed provisions and subsequently forwarded its views to the appropriate oversight committees.

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**SEPTEMBER** In September, Ms. Rita Sampson, Chief of Intelligence Community Equal Employment Opportunity and Diversity, joined the Forum to discuss diversity and inclusion matters. Ms. Sampson shared hiring, promotion, and attrition trends, and briefed findings from recent IC studies and reports. Forum members learned of new initiatives and programs to increase and promote inclusion throughout the IC. In addition, the Forum further discussed proposed revisions to the IC IG’s procedures related to ERPs.

# THE INSPECTOR GENERAL COMMUNITY

This year marks the 42nd anniversary of the *Inspector General Act of 1978*. President Jimmy Carter signed the Act and described the new statutory Inspectors General as “perhaps the most important new tools in the fight against fraud.” The IC IG, one of 74 Inspectors General collectively overseeing the operations of nearly every aspect of the federal government, looks forward to continuing to work with CIGIE on important issues that significantly affect productivity, transparency, and accountability throughout the federal government.



## Oversight.gov

**SORT. SEARCH. FILTER.**

*Oversight.gov* provides a “one stop shop” to follow the ongoing oversight work of all OIGs that publicly post reports. CIGIE manages the website on behalf of the federal Inspector General community. The IC IG, like other OIGs, will continue to post reports to its own website as well as to *Oversight.gov* to afford users the benefits of the website’s search and retrieval features.



*Oversight.gov* allows users to sort, search, and filter the site’s database of public reports from all CIGIE member OIGs to find reports of interest.

In addition, the site features a user-friendly map that allows users to find reports based on geographic location, and contact information for each OIG’s hotline. Users can receive notifications when new reports are added to the site by following @OversightGov, CIGIE’s Twitter account.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

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Following publication of an inspection report, the IC IG's Inspections and Evaluations Division interacts with the inspected elements at least quarterly to ensure actions are taken to implement report recommendations. A description of the actions are entered into the IC IG's recommendations tracking database. Inspections and Evaluations leadership has the responsibility for approving the closure of a recommendation once it has been demonstrated that responsive actions have met the intent of a recommendation. The Inspections and Evaluations Division may revisit closed recommendations to ensure there is no slippage or back-tracking in their fulfillment or to inform follow-on reviews.

For the ODNI to realize the maximum benefit from IC IG audits, management should ensure that adequate corrective action is taken in a timely manner to address audit recommendations. The Audit Division closely monitors implementation of its recommendations through continuous communication with stakeholder points of contact on progress and actions. The status of open recommendations is periodically conveyed to ODNI senior managers. The Audit Division issues a memorandum for formal closure when it determines that all recommendations in a report have been addressed.

## RECOMMENDATIONS TABLE

	REPORT NAME	DATE ISSUED	TOTAL ISSUED	NEW THIS PERIOD	CLOSED THIS PERIOD	CURRENTLY OPEN
FY 2020	Audit: Office of the Director of National Intelligence's Government Travel Card Program	July	11	11	1	10
	Audit: FY 2019 Independent Evaluation of <i>Federal Information Security Modernization Act</i> (FISMA)	October	2	0	0	2
	Inspection: ODNI's Oversight of Intelligence Community Major Systems Acquisition Cybersecurity Risks	November	7	0	2	5
FY 2019	Audit: Office of the Director of National Intelligence's FY 2018 Conference Spending	September	2	0	0	2
	Audit: Management of Privileged Users of Office of the Director of National Intelligence Information Systems	September	9	0	0	9
	Inspection: Assessment of the ODNI Methods Used to Substantiate Post-Secondary Education Claims Made by ODNI Employees Subsequent to Entry-on-Duty	August	7	0	0	5
	Audit: FY 2018 Independent Evaluation of <i>Federal Information Security Modernization Act</i> (FISMA)	February	11	0	0	10
	Inspection: Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center	January	9	0	0	7
FY 2018	Inspection: Assessment of IC Information System Deterrence, Detection, and Mitigation of Insider Threats	March	4	0	0	1
	Inspection: <i>IC Freedom of Information Act</i> (FOIA) Programs	September	10	0	0	3
	Audit: Memorandum to the Chief Operating Officer re: Charge Card Program	August	2	0	0	1



## RECOMMENDATIONS TABLE

REPORT NAME	DATE ISSUED	TOTAL ISSUED	NEW THIS PERIOD	CLOSED THIS PERIOD	CURRENTLY OPEN
FY 2017 Inspection: Assessment of ODNI Information System Deterrence, Detection, and Mitigation of Insider Threats	September	19	0	0	1
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>56</b>	

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# ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

The Center ..... Center for Protected Disclosures  
CIA ..... Central Intelligence Agency  
CIGIE ..... Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency  
COVID-19 ..... Coronavirus 2019  
DIA ..... Defense Intelligence Agency  
DNI ..... Director of National Intelligence  
DoD ..... Department of Defense  
ERP ..... External Review Panel  
The Forum ..... Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum  
FBI ..... Federal Bureau of Investigation  
FOIA ..... Freedom of Information Act  
FY ..... Fiscal Year  
HAC-D ..... House Appropriations Committee - Defense  
HPSCI ..... House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence  
I&E ..... Inspections and Evaluations  
IC ..... Intelligence Community  
IC IG ..... Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

ICWPA ..... Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act  
IG ..... Inspector General  
IPERA ..... Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act  
ISCM ..... Information Security Continuous Monitoring  
MAC ..... Management Advisory Committee  
NGA ..... National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency  
NRO ..... National Reconnaissance Office  
NSA ..... National Security Agency  
ODNI ..... Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
OIG ..... Office of the Inspector General  
OMB ..... Office of Management and Budget  
PPD ..... Presidential Policy Directive  
SAC-D ..... Senate Appropriations Committee - Defense  
SES ..... Senior Executive Service  
SLRG ..... Senior Leader Recovery Group  
SSCI ..... Senate Select Committee on Intelligence



Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

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