


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Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Best Practices to Protect Privacy, Civil Liberties, and Civil Rights of Americans of Chinese Descent in the Conduct of U.S. Intelligence Activities Report Covering 2023, 2024, 2025

March 2026



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Executive Summary

In 2020 and 2021, Congress directed the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to submit a report on how U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) activities to counter threats posed by China could affect Americans of Chinese descent.¹ In response, the Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency (CLPT) within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), acting on behalf of the DNI, led an interagency review. Specifically, the review examined the IC's safeguards for privacy, civil liberties, and related civil rights during intelligence and counterintelligence activities that counter national security threats from China.

ODNI CLPT subsequently provided the results of its examination in the May 2022 report *Best Practices to Protect Privacy, Civil Liberties, and Civil Rights of Americans of Chinese Descent on the Conduct of U.S. Intelligence Activities* (hereafter the May 2022 report). The report described Chinese intelligence activities that pose a threat to U.S. national security and examined U.S. intelligence, counterintelligence, and security measures taken to counteract the threat, focusing on how those U.S. activities may affect privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights. It concluded that “[t]he privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights protections embedded in these intelligence programs [... and activities] protect all Americans.”² (Emphasis added.) Those protections, the report states, are consistent with the IC's solemn obligation to provide equal protection to all U.S. persons in accordance with the United States Constitution and law.

This current report combines three years of reporting 2023–2025 because the May 2022 report's findings remain unchanged. Specifically, China and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remain a threat to U.S. national security, and U.S. intelligence, counterintelligence, and security activities continue to safeguard the privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights of all Americans. ODNI CLPT found no legal or policy changes that counter the May 2022 findings. In particular, **ODNI CLPT found no legal or policy changes that would**

¹ Specifically, Section 5712 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92 (amending the National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253), required the DNI to submit a report to Congress reviewing “how the policies, procedures, and practices of the intelligence community that govern intelligence activities and operations targeting the People's Republic of China affect policies, procedures, and practices relating to the privacy and civil liberties of Americans of Chinese descent who may be targets of espionage and influence operations by China.” The law also requires that the report include recommendations “to ensure that the privacy and civil liberties of Americans of Chinese descent are sufficiently protected.” Subsequently, Section 620 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, made the previously described report an annual requirement for the Director of National Intelligence and requires the report to address the civil rights of Americans of Chinese descent in addition to earlier references to privacy and civil liberties.

² See May 2022 Report at 3 available at https://www.dni.gov/files/CLPT/documents/ODNI_Report_on_Best_Practices_to_Protect_Privacy_Civil_Liberties_and_Civil_Rights_of_Americans_of_Chinese_Descent_in_ConductOf_US_Intelligence_Activities_May_2022.pdf.

allow the IC to conduct intelligence activities or make employment decisions based solely on the race or ethnicity of any U.S. person.

Since the May 2022 report, ODNI CLPT has identified new laws, regulations, and policies that provide additional privacy and civil liberties safeguards. This report details those updates.

Background

National Security Threat Posed by China

The IC assessed in its February 2023 and February 2024 *Annual Threat Assessment[s] of the U.S. Intelligence Community* (ATA) that the CCP will continue “undercutting U.S. influence, driving wedges between Washington and its partners, and fostering global norms that favor its authoritarian system.”³ As a component of these efforts, both the 2023 and 2024 ATAs stated that China “will continue expanding its global intelligence and covert influence posture to better support the CCP’s political, economic, and security goals, increasingly challenging U.S. influence.”⁴ For these purposes, China “uses a sophisticated array of covert... means,”⁵ including “monitor[ing] Chinese students abroad for dissident views, mobiliz[ing] Chinese student associations to conduct activities on behalf of Beijing, and influenc[ing] research by U.S. academics and think tank experts.”⁶

The 2025 ATA states that China “will continue to expand its coercive and subversive malign influence activities to weaken the United States internally and globally, as well as counter what Beijing sees as a U.S.-led campaign to tarnish China’s global relations and overthrow the CCP.”⁷ Overall, “PRC actors’ [sic] have [continued to] increase[] their capabilities to conduct covert influence operations and disseminate disinformation.”⁸

³ See February 2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community (hereafter 2023 ATA) at 6, available at <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2022-Unclassified-Report.pdf> and February 2024 Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community (hereafter 2024 ATA) at 7, available at <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-Report.pdf>. See also March 2025 Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community (hereafter 2025 ATA) at 9, available at <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2025-Unclassified-Report.pdf>.

⁴ See 2023 ATA at 10 and 2024 ATA at 12.

⁵ See 2023 ATA at 10.

⁶ *Id.*

⁷ See 2025 ATA at 15.

⁸ See 2024 ATA at 12 and 2025 ATA at 15.

U.S. Government (USG) investigations continue to show that the CCP and China's intelligence actors use Chinese nationals' access and ties to the United States—and Americans' ties to China—as a tool to target information of interest.⁹

In 2024, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) announced charges against five Chinese nationals for covering up a visit to a sensitive military training site in Michigan, where they photographed the facility. The FBI has also cited previous cases in which Chinese college students photographed critical U.S. defense sites.¹⁰ Separately, a Chinese national was charged and later sentenced for flying a drone into restricted airspace after the nighttime launch of a National Reconnaissance Office satellite; federal authorities described the incident as a national security threat and recovered images depicting locations in both the United States and China.¹¹

Between 2008 and 2018, four Chinese nationals, including three intelligence operatives from China's Ministry of State Security (MSS), conducted intelligence gathering and recruitment of U.S. citizens on behalf of the Chinese government. The MSS operatives posed as academics from the Institute for International Studies at Ocean University of China and targeted individuals with security clearances or specialized expertise, including university professors, law-enforcement officials, and homeland-security personnel. To cultivate trust, they offered incentives such as all-expenses-paid trips to China and consulting-service contracts with Chinese companies.¹²

In 2019, Zhongsan Liu entered the United States on a J-1 research-scholar visa. Investigators later found that he conspired to defraud the visa system and recruit U.S. talent for the benefit of China. Operating from the New York office of the China Association for International Exchange of Personnel (CAIEP), an organization affiliated with the Chinese

⁹ See U.S. Navy Sailor Sentenced to 27 Months in Prison for Transmitting Sensitive U.S. Military Information to Chinese Intelligence Monday, 8 January 2024, available at <https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/us-navy-sailor-sentenced-27-months-prison-transmitting-sensitive-us-military-information>; See Former CIA Officer Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Commit Espionage Friday, 24 May 2024, available at <https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/former-cia-officer-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-commit-espionage-0>; See U.S. Navy Sailor Convicted of Spying for China Thursday, 21 August 2025, available at <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-navy-sailor-convicted-spying-china>.

¹⁰ See Chinese National Sentenced Following Drone Flight During Restricted Launch, 5 May 2025, available at <https://www.newsweek.com/fbi-chinese-nationals-charged-covering-visit-military-site-1962991>.

¹¹ See Chinese National Sentenced Following Drone Flight During Restricted Launch, 5 May 2025, available at <https://www.osi.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/4174084/chinese-national-sentenced-following-drone-flight-during-restricted-launch/>.

¹² See Chinese Intelligence Officers Charged with Using Academic Cover to Target Individuals in United States Monday, 24 October 2022, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/chinese-intelligence-officers-charged-using-academic-cover-target-individuals-united?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

government, Liu posed as a Research Scholar and targeted a U.S. university to recruit personnel. His prior employment with CAIEP likely facilitated his activities.¹³

While the CCP and Chinese government pose the national security threats described above, the people of China and, emphatically, Americans of Chinese descent, do not. Americans of Chinese descent continue to be targeted and victimized by CCP transnational repression. In 2017, President Xi Jinping declared China's intention to target "overseas Chinese" and created the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office to recruit Chinese emigrants with access to sought-after information.¹⁴

Protecting Privacy and Civil Liberties of All Americans, including Chinese Americans

The IC may *not* target an individual for intelligence collection because the person is an American of Chinese descent. An American of Chinese descent must not be subjected to greater scrutiny during security clearance processes based on race or ethnicity. The law is clear: no IC agency or component may conduct intelligence activities—including targeting or collection of information—or make employment decisions—including granting or revoking security clearances or initiating related investigative steps—based on the race or ethnicity of any U.S. person.

Executive Order (E.O.) 12968, Section 3.1(d), makes clear that the USG "does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, or sexual orientation in granting access to classified information."¹⁵ In addition to these binding legal obligations, the IC remains deeply committed to securing the nation while upholding American values. Those values include fair treatment of persons of all races and ethnicities.

Conducting intelligence activities based on race or ethnicity is also entirely inconsistent with the objective, fact-based criteria that underlie the tradecraft used by the IC. In a manner authorized by law, the IC must base its foreign intelligence and counterintelligence collection activities on fact-based determinations regarding whether individuals have access to the information needed for the IC to fulfill its mission. Conducting intelligence activities or subjecting individuals to greater scrutiny during the security background process based upon race or ethnicity does not reflect the IC's commitment to objective intelligence collection.

¹³ See Chinese Government Employee Charged in Manhattan Federal Court with Participating in Conspiracy to Fraudulently Obtain U.S. Visas, 16 September 2019, available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/chinese-government-employee-charged-manhattan-federal-court-participating-conspiracy?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

¹⁴ See Time to Protect Chinese Americans Targeted by China's Espionage Teams, 7 September 2023, available at <https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/time-protect-chinese-americans-targeted-chinas-espionage-teams>.

¹⁵ See E.O. 12968, Access to Classified Information.

Intelligence collection or security clearance actions based on such an unauthorized purpose violate the law, are inconsistent with the IC's values, and would not reflect the IC's fact and risk-based approach to intelligence tradecraft.

The May 2022 Report Summary

Prior to issuing the May 2022 report, ODNI CLPT led an interagency examination of the IC's privacy, civil liberties, and related civil rights controls used by the IC when conducting intelligence and counterintelligence activities to counter the national security threats posed by China. ODNI CLPT detailed its examination in the May 2022 Report. The examination reviewed the privacy, civil liberties, and related civil rights controls and related training, oversight, and avenues for the public to raise concerns regarding IC conduct with respect to Americans of Chinese descent.¹⁶

In particular, ODNI CLPT focused its review on "three broad categories of intelligence and related security activities" to counter the threat posed by China.¹⁷ Specifically:

- (1) authorized IC foreign intelligence and counterintelligence collection that intentionally collects information regarding a particular U.S. person,
- (2) incidental collection of U.S. person information (including of Americans of Chinese descent) acquired in the course of authorized foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities that do not target U.S. persons, and
- (3) security investigations related to the grant or revocation of a security clearance.¹⁸

Importantly, **the examination revealed "[t]he privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights protections embedded in these intelligence programs [(including IC policies and procedures)] protect all Americans."**¹⁹ Those protections are consistent with the IC's solemn obligation to provide equal protection to all U.S. persons in accordance with U.S. law and values.

The May 2022 Report stated that "[a]lthough IC policies and procedures reflect an appropriate focus on the protection of privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights in the targeting and scope of intelligence and related security activities," ODNI made four recommendations to "further ensure the protection of the privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights of all Americans, including Americans of Chinese descent."²⁰ ODNI's recommendations and implementation status are discussed in the following section.

¹⁶ See the May 2022 Report.

¹⁷ *Id.* at 3-4.

¹⁸ *Id.* at 3 and 8.

¹⁹ *Id.* (emphasis supplied).

²⁰ *Id.* at 5.

Updates

The May 2022 Report Recommendations and Current Implementation Status

In the May 2022 Report ODNI provided recommendations to enhance and further emphasize the existing protections, including enhancing related training and awareness of potential privacy and civil liberties impacts on U.S. persons in intelligence activities.

Upon review of the recommendations and recent updates to laws and policies, as discussed below, ODNI has determined that further recommendations and study are not needed at this time. ODNI will continue to monitor as required by law in the event the status changes. The May 2022 Report recommendations and implementation statuses follow.

Recommendation 1: “IC agencies and components reemphasize the prohibition on conducting intelligence and related security activities based on race or ethnicity, to include those related to the granting or revocation of security clearances, in their training materials.”²¹

Implemented on a continuing, as needed basis: Since May 2022, the IC’s existing guidance and training continue to implement this recommendation. Emphasizing adherence to law and prohibiting activities not based on legitimate objectives is a part of routine training that is given to both IC analysts and individuals in security vetting positions. The IC continues to evaluate policies, guidance, and training to enhance compliance with all relevant laws. Specific updates to policies and training are detailed below.

Recommendation 2: “[A]ll IC agencies and components are encouraged to expand unconscious bias and cultural competency training to personnel involved in intelligence collection and security clearance processes.”²²

Not implemented, in part: the particularized training is no longer assessed to be an impactful recommendation. After the May 2022 Report was issued, ODNI further engaged with the IC, in particular the IC Civil Liberties and Privacy Council (IC CLP Council), which includes IC privacy and civil liberties officers, to assess the value of the recommended expanded training. Subsequently, ODNI determined that all the different training already focused on complying with the U.S. Constitution, laws, and procedures protecting U.S. Persons and therefore, the recommended particularized training was unlikely to add any further civil liberties or privacy protections. Thus, ODNI determined that the recommended particular training would not significantly enhance any protections while, at the same time, would divert resources and attention from current training.

²¹ *Id.*

²² *Id.*

Implemented, in-part, on continued, as needed basis: existing and new training to protect civil liberties and privacy of all Americans continues to be implemented. In addition to existing training (which is reviewed frequently to ensure it appropriately enhances compliance and civil liberties and privacy safeguards), ODNI notes that the new policies in Recommendation 1, as detailed below, often require new training to properly implement those new policies addressing the protection of privacy and civil liberties. The relevant new training is detailed below.

Recommendation 3: “[P]rivacy, civil rights, and civil liberties officers further develop and, when relevant, highlight the potential for disparate impacts on historically disadvantaged groups of U.S. persons, including Americans of Chinese descent, when conducting analyses and making recommendations regarding intelligence and related security activities.”²³

Not implemented: implementing the recommendation was not determined to be feasible or protective of Americans’ privacy and civil liberties. After the May 2022 Report was issued, ODNI CLPT held extensive meetings and discussions with the IC CLP Council to identify a feasible way to implement this recommendation. Given the IC does not conduct intelligence or security activities targeting certain groups of Americans, after extensive discussion, the IC did not find any viable implementation approaches. The discussions revealed substantial risk in potential implementation because highlighting impacts on specific demographic groups of Americans would require additional data collection and increased focus on those groups in ways that analysts and security professionals assessed may inadvertently create civil liberties and privacy risks to those groups.

Recommendation 4: “ODNI will explore its ability to generate and make public demographic metrics regarding the length of time and the results of security clearance processes. These metrics would be utilized to identify and help rectify processes that may have a disparate impact on specific racial or ethnic groups.”²⁴

Implemented, in part, as to metrics on the timing of security clearance processes. Since May 2022, the IC initiated certain efforts to expand collection of such metrics, although such metrics will not include demographics related to race and ethnicity. Specific updates are detailed below.

Not implemented, in part, as to demographic metrics in the timing of security clearance processes: implementing the recommendation was not determined to be feasible or protective of Americans’ privacy and civil liberties. After the May 2022 Report was issued, ODNI CLPT engaged with relevant IC offices, including those responsible for security clearances. Those engagements revealed that demographic information concerning ethnic or racial background has been and is omitted from information collected during the security clearance process in an effort to eliminate

²³ *Id.*

²⁴ *Id.*

bias in the adjudicative process. Thus, implementing this recommendation to gather such demographic metrics from the IC offices was not feasible: such metrics currently do not exist because demographic information is not collected from applicants. Further, as noted in the Recommendation 3 evaluation above, it was determined that specifically requiring Americans to list such racial or ethnic demographics in the future presents a substantial risk to privacy and civil liberties in that such could create bias in the adjudicative process.

Additional safeguards addressing Recommendations 1 and 2 are detailed below.

New Laws, Regulations, Policies, and Training that Enhance Protections

Since the May 2022 Report, ODNI CLPT has monitored new applicable laws, regulations, and policies so as to identify any potential risks or negative impacts. Based on its review, **ODNI CLPT has not identified any potential risks or negative impacts to Americans** (including Chinese Americans) based on their ethnicity or race when the IC conducts intelligence activities or security clearance investigations.

ODNI CLPT has, however, identified *additional safeguards* that have been developed since the May 2022 Report and which implement Recommendations 1 and 2.

As it pertains to safeguards extending across the entire Federal Government—and to which the IC must adhere as well—in April of 2025, the President signed E.O. 14821, *Restoring Equality of Opportunity and Meritocracy*, stating that:

“[a] bedrock principle of the United States is that all citizens are treated equally under the law... It promises that people are treated as individuals, not components of a particular race or group... Adherence to this principle is essential to creating opportunity, encouraging achievement, and sustaining the American Dream.”

This E.O. underpins the IC’s commitment to treating all Americans equally under the law.

Enhanced Protections in Conducting Intelligence Activities

Specific to intelligence activities, the IC has implemented the following new laws, regulations, and policies. These efforts implement the May 2022 Report Recommendation 1 by emphasizing the prohibition on conducting intelligence activities based on race or ethnicity and Recommendation 2 by requiring new or updated training.

In particular, the following efforts direct the IC to not target individuals based on their race or ethnicity and to appropriately protect the privacy and civil liberties of all Americans whose information may be incidentally collected.

In October 2022, the President signed E.O. 14086, *Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activities*, which applies to US Persons and non-US persons.²⁵ The E.O. recognizes that:

“signals intelligence activities must take into account that all persons should be treated with dignity and respect, regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside, and that all persons have legitimate privacy interests in the handling of their personal information.”²⁶

In particular, E.O. 14086 lists prohibited signals intelligence collection activities. Specifically, Section 2(b)(ii)(A)(4) directs that “signals intelligence collection activities shall not be conducted for the purpose of... disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity [or] race.”

E.O. 14086 further requires each IC element to have implementing procedures that require, among other things, training on the E.O.’s requirements. By July 2023, all IC elements had issued implementing procedures and updated relevant training. Together, E.O. 14086, the IC elements’ implementing procedures, and the revised training fulfill the May 2022 report’s Recommendations 1 and 2, reemphasizing the prohibition of race- or ethnicity-based intelligence activities and expanding related training.

In December 2022, the United States joined other members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in adopting the *Declaration on Government Access to Data Held by Private-Sector Entities* (the Trusted Government Access, or TGA Declaration). The TGA Declaration is the first such agreement to set out a common set of principles to safeguard privacy and other human rights and freedoms when governments access private-sector data for national security or law-enforcement purposes.

One of the TGA Declaration’s principles, “Legitimate aims,” specifies that governments that adopted the Declaration, including the United States, may access such data only to pursue legitimate aims consistent with the rule of law. It further states that governments must *not* seek access to personal data for the purpose of “disadvantaging persons or groups solely on the basis of... ethnicity...”²⁷

The TGA Declaration covers government access by intelligence communities, including the U.S. IC, because it focuses on government access to private-sector data for national-security and law-enforcement purposes. The United States’ adoption of the TGA

²⁵ E.O. 14086 “is not intended to alter the rules applicable to United States Persons adopted pursuant to FISA, Executive Order 12333, or other applicable law.” E.O. 14086, Section 5(e).

²⁶ E.O. 14086 section 1.

²⁷ OECD TGA Declaration, at 7.

Declaration illustrates the IC's commitment to conduct intelligence activities that are consistent with law and limited to specified purposes, not based solely on ethnicity.

By adopting the TGA Declaration, the United States implemented the May 2022 report's recommendations that IC elements reemphasize the prohibition on race- or ethnicity-based intelligence activities.

In May 2024, the DNI issued the *IC Policy Framework for Commercially Available Information* (CAI) (hereafter the CAI Framework) to advance privacy and civil-liberties safeguards for acquiring and using CAI. The CAI Framework opens with general principles for the IC's access to, collection of, and processing of CAI, including that such activities must comply with law and that "the IC shall *not* access, collect, or process CAI for the purpose of disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, [and] race..."²⁸ It then sets out specific safeguards for accessing, collecting, and processing sensitive CAI, including data on the race or ethnicity of U.S. Persons.²⁹

Prior to accessing, collecting, or processing sensitive CAI, an IC element must, among other safeguards, assess whether the sensitive CAI supports an authorized intelligence mission or administrative function, determine whether the intelligence value outweighs any related privacy and civil-liberties risks, and confirm that acquisition is consistent with applicable legal authority.

The CAI Framework implements the May 2022 report's recommendation to reemphasize the prohibition of conducting intelligence activities based on race or ethnicity.

In January 2025, the DNI signed IC Directive (ICD) 505, *Artificial Intelligence* (AI), which provides policy for the IC's use of AI while "maintaining the IC's commitment to the U.S. Constitution and rule of law and to responsible and ethical AI."³⁰ ICD 505 directs the IC to mitigate unintended bias, prohibits unlawful discriminatory bias in AI systems and their use, and establishes oversight requirements to prevent violations of civil-liberties and privacy protections.

Although ICD 505 does not explicitly address race or ethnicity, it reaffirms the IC's commitment to conduct intelligence activities, including the use of AI, in a manner consistent with the U.S. Constitution, the rule of law, and safeguards for privacy and civil liberties. By reaffirming those principles, ICD 505 implements Recommendation 1 of the May 2022 report.

²⁸ CAI Framework at 2.

²⁹ *Id.* at 3

³⁰ ICD 505 at 2.

Enhanced Protections in the Security Clearance Process

The IC has adopted the following policies that implement Recommendation 1 by emphasizing the prohibition on conducting intelligence security (*i.e.*, activities related to the granting or revocation of security clearances) based on race or ethnicity and implements Recommendation 2 by requiring new or updated training.

The IC has initiated the following efforts to strengthen protections for all Americans undergoing security clearance investigatory processing.

As noted in the May 2022 report, the DNI, in her role as the Security Executive Agent (SecEA), issued the *Federal Personnel Vetting Engagement Guidelines* in February 2022. The Guidelines provide specific guidance for security personnel on engaging the public in a manner that fosters trust, helps individuals enter the workforce promptly, and shapes a culture of personal accountability and shared responsibility.

In July 2022, the SecEA signed the *Common Principles in Applying Federal Personnel Vetting Adjudicative Standards* (hereafter Vetting Principles) to “align commonalities in adjudication across personnel vetting domains.”³¹ It instructs elements to “protect the privacy and civil liberties of all individuals” and to ensure that vetting adjudicators receive appropriate training.³² In May 2025, the SecEA reissued the Vetting Principles, adding that agencies must ensure adjudicators treat individuals undergoing personnel vetting with fairness, dignity, and respect, adhere to legal and ethical requirements, and not engage in unlawful discrimination.

The Vetting Principles implement the May 2022 report’s recommendations to reemphasize the prohibition of conducting security-clearance investigations on the basis of race or ethnicity and to expand training for personnel involved in the adjudication process.

In September 2023, the SecEA revised *National Security Adjudication Training Standards* (NTS) to provide, among other things, standards for clearance adjudicators to ensure consistent processes for individuals undergoing federal personnel vetting. All federal security adjudicators, including those in the IC, must follow the NTS. Relevant to this report, NTS learning objectives require adjudicators to recognize and apply the Privacy Act and other federal laws, policies, and regulations that protect privacy and civil liberties.³³ Another objective directs adjudicators on properly handling case information that contains personally

³¹ Vetting Principles at 1.

³² *Id.* at 3.

³³ NTS at Module I, 02.

identifiable information.³⁴ Together, these objectives protect the privacy and civil liberties of all Americans.

The IC's adherence to the updated NTS demonstrates implementation of the May 2022 report's recommendations to reemphasize the prohibition on race- or ethnicity-based security-clearance investigations and to expand relevant training for personnel involved in the adjudication process.

Conclusion

While continuing to combat the significant national security threat posed by China, IC agencies and components must ensure that IC activities and security clearance processes protect the privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights of Americans of Chinese descent and all other Americans. Adherence to the law and policies that govern the IC, as well as the IC's values and professional tradecraft standards, helps ensure equal protection and treatment of all Americans.

Upon review of the May 2022 recommendations and recent updates to laws and policies, ODNI has determined that further recommendations and study are not needed at this time. ODNI will continue to monitor as required by law in the event the status changes. As with the previous report, this current report finds that the IC continues to adhere to the Constitution and all relevant U.S. laws to ensure that intelligence activities and the security clearance process protect all Americans'—including Americans of Chinese descent—privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights.

³⁴ *Id.* at Module III, 01.

Appendix: Acronyms/Abbreviations

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ACRONYM/ ABBREVIATION	DEFINITION
AI	Artificial Intelligence
ATA	Annual Threat Assessment
CAI	Commercially Available Information
CAIEP	China Association for International Exchange of Personnel
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CLPT	Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency
DNI	Director of National Intelligence
E.O.	Executive Order
IC	Intelligence Community
IC CLP Council	IC Civil Liberties and Privacy Council
ICD	Intelligence Community Directive
MSS	Ministry of State Security
NTS	National Security Adjudication Training Standards
ODNI	Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OECD	Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
SecEA	Security Executive Agent
TGA	Trusted Government Access
USG	United States Government