

## 30 Days Until Election 2024 **Election Security Update as of Early October 2024**

A range of foreign actors continue to try to influence U.S. elections as we approach November. These activities include broad efforts aimed at undermining trust in U.S. democratic processes and exacerbating divisions in our society, while also seeking to shape voter preferences toward specific candidates. Our assessments about the activities and goals of Russia, Iran, and China are unchanged from earlier election security updates. On the presidential race, the IC continues to assess that Russia prefers the Former President and Iran prefers the Vice President; China is not seeking to influence the Presidential election.

• As we approach election day, the IC also expects foreign influence actors to continue their campaigns by calling into question the validity of the election's results after the polls close. Foreign actors are almost certainly considering the possibility of another contested presidential election and a tight contest for control of both the Senate and the House of Representatives. They will likely take advantage of such an opportunity to use similar tactics in a post-election period to undermine trust in the integrity of the election, election processes, and further exacerbate divisions among Americans.

## **Efforts Targeting Congressional and Other Races**

Although much of the attention during this election cycle has been on foreign efforts to shape the U.S. presidential race, the IC assesses some foreign actors are also supporting or denigrating candidates involved in congressional, as well as state and local races. These foreign actors determine which candidates to support or oppose based on the actor's perception of how an individual candidate's foreign policy positions affect their national security interests. Specifically:



Russia is leveraging a wide range of influence actors in an effort to influence congressional races and in particular to encourage the U.S. public to oppose pro-Ukraine policies and politicians. Russian influence actors have planned and likely created and disseminated content, particularly over social media, intended to encourage the election of congressional candidates Moscow assesses will oppose aid to Ukraine.



China is seeking to influence congressional races with candidates—regardless of party affiliation—perceived by Beijing to threaten its core interests, especially in relation to Taiwan.



The IC has not observed Iran seeking to influence congressional or state and local races during this election cycle. This is consistent with Tehran's approach in 2020, though the IC continues to monitor for any change to its strategy.

The IC is also monitoring other foreign actors who are conducting or have considered influence operations to support or oppose specific candidates. These operations are typically focused on particular candidates, tailored for specific demographics or constituencies, and use tactics such as posting on social media platforms, seeding articles in the U.S. media, or illicitly funding campaigns.

· Cuba, for example, probably views this year's election as consequential, and it almost certainly has considered influence efforts targeting some candidates, consistent with past election cycles. We assess Havana may be, as it has done in previous cycles, trying to curry favor from congressional and subnational politicians that it believes would support their preferred policies.